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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PHILLIP E. ELLIS and
CAROLYN B. ELLIS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
10526

MRS. BETTY GILBERT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Carolyn B. Ellis, and by
Phillip E. Ellis, for the death of his unborn child,
and damage to his automobile.
This case is before the Court upon an Intermediate Appeal, the Order granting the Interlocutory Appeal having been entered February 8, 1966.
The defendant and appellant petitioned for an Intermediate Appeal from an Order of the District
Court of Duchesne County, requiring the defendant
and appellant to answer an Interrogatory submitted
by the plaintiffs and respondents.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of Duchesne County, Joseph
E. Nelson, Judge, entered an Order requiring the
defendant and appellant to answer an Interrogatory inquiring as to the existence of liability insurance, and the name of the defendant's liability
insurance carrier.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Order
of the District Court requiring answer to the Interrogatory as to the existence of liability insurance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs commenced an action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
seeking to recover damages against Mrs. Betty Gilbert for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Carolyn B. Ellis. Phillip E. Ellis, in a separate cause of action, asks damages because of the
death of his unborn child, and for damages to the
automobile which his wife was driving at the time
of the accident ( R. 2-3) .
Venue in this action was changed to Duchesne
County, State of Utah (R. 1).
Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, served Interrogatories to be answered
by the defendant.
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 18 was as follows:
"18. Was the defendant insured or does she
2

claim to be insured by any policy or
general liability insurance at the time
of the alleged casualty. If this interrogatory is answered in the affirmative:
(a) State the name of the company issuing such police and the amount of
coverage.
( b) If the defendant claims to be so
insured and said claim has been
denied, state in detail the facts
upon which you rely as a basis for
said claim." (R. 16)
The defendant filed a timely objection to the
Interrogatory, and specifically objected to Interrogatory No. 18 and subdivisions, for the reasons
that the information sought by said Interrogatory
was not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence, and it was not
relevant to the subject matter in the pending action,
and did not relate to the claim or defense of either
party (R. 18).
Argument on the Objections to Interrogatories
was heard by Judge Joseph E. Nelson, and by Order
dated December 7, 1965, filed December 9, 1965,
Judge Nelson ordered the defendant to answer Interrogatory No. 18 (R. 28).
The defendant filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal ( R. 30), and the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah granted an Interlocutory Appeal,
February 8, 1966 (R. 38).
3

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING
THE DEFENDANT TO ANSWER THE INTERROGATORY RELATING TO THE NAME OF DEFENDANT'S
INSURANCE CARRIER AND THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY.

The Interrogatories of plaintiffs' to be answered by the defendant and appellant were served pursuant to the provisions of Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The second paragraph
of Rule 33 provides:
"Interrogatories may relate to any matters
which can be inquired into under Rule 26
(b) . . . "
Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION. Unless
otherwise ordered by the Court, as provided by Rule 30 ( b) or ( d) , the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the examining party,
or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the exist.ei:ice, description, nature, custody, cond1t10n and location of any books, documents or other
tangible things, and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of
the relevant facts. It is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be in4

admissible at the trial if the testimcmy
sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Emphasis ours)
Rule 26(b) specifically sets forth that Interrogatories may be used to obtain information regarding any matter, not privileged, (a) which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party; (b) or the claim or
defense of any party; ( c) including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents or other tangible things,
and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of the relevant facts.
The Rule further provides it is not ground
for objection that testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if:
" . . . the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
The Rules of Procedure indicate clearly that
the scope of examination is as set forth in Rule
26 ( b). In this case, question as to whether the defendant does or does not have liability insurance
is not relevant to the subject matter of the cause
of action, and cannot, under any theory, relate to
the claim of the plaintiffs, or to the defense of defendant, and is not possibly calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.
5
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Utah Rules 33 and 26(b) are duplicates of
Rule 33 and Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
In discussing the limitations and boundaries
of discovery, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 ( 1947)
stated:
"The various instruments of discovery now
serve ( 1) as a device, along with the PreTrial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties,
and ( 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts,
or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues." ( 329
U.S. 501)
And as to the purpose of discovery, Barron & Holtzof f, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 641,
P.10, state:
"Discovery has three distinct purposes and
uses: ( 1) To narrow the issues, in order that
at the trial it may be necessary to produce
evidence only as to a residue of matters which
are found to be actually disputed and controverted; ( 2) To obtain evidence for use at
the trial; ( 3) To secure information as to
the existence of evidence that may be used
at the trial and to ascertain how and from
whom it may be procured, as for instance,
the existence, custody and location of pertinent documents of the names and addresses
of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts."
Most of the Federal Courts that have had
6

occasion to consider the question here involved have
held that the scope of the Federal Rules of Discovery, even though subject to a liberal interpretation, are not broad enough to permit inquiry
into a defendant's liability insurance policy or its
limits. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion in which it reviewed all of the Federal cases involving this question, in the case of
Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W. 2d 649 (1955), denied the plaintiff's petition to require defendant
to produce his policy of liability insurance for examination. The Court stated:
"The rationale of the great bulk of federal
cases dealing with the discovery rules is that
the information sought by the discovery must
either be admissible on a trial of the issues
involved in the case or it must be such facts
or information as will lead to the discovery
of evidentiary information in some way related to the proof or defense of issues involved in the trial of the case." (68 N.W.2d
653)
Since the Jeppesen decision, Supra, there have
been two recent decisions from the Federal District
Courts in Illinois - Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D.
283 (E.D. Ill. 1958) and Roembke v. Wisdom, 22
F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958). The Court in the Gallimore case, in denying the use of Interrogatories
to discover the limits of insurance, pointed out that
the presence or absence of insurance by the defendant has no bearing on the issue of liability in negli7

gence actions, for the defendant's negligence "is
the gravaman in such actions".
In the Roembke case, the Court, in denying the
use of Interrogatories, stated:
"The purpose of discovery is for preparation
for trial. A party, by use of the discovery
rules, may obtain direct evidence for use in
trial, or may obtain pertinent information
that will lead to evidence for use in trial. The
scope of discovery is broad, and so long as
information sought by interrogatories or
deposition can reasonably be said to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence it must
be given . . .
"The existence or non-existence of liability
insurance is not an evidentiary matter that
may be used at the trial, nor is it relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." (22 F.R.D. 199)
Disregarding those cases where the Courts
have permitted a party to inquire into the existence of an insurance policy by reason of statutes
permitting a '"direct action" against a wrongdoer's
insurer (Louisiana and Wisconsin have such statutes) and those where the liability insurance was
material and relevant to an issue raised such as a
contested issue of operation and control or ownership of an automobile (none of which are involved
here), the great majority of State Courts have
held that an inquiry by a party as to the opposing
party's insurance coverage is not permissible.
In Bean v. Best, 80 N.W.2d 565 ( S.D. 1957), the
8

Court denied a plaintiff Pre-Trial discovery of insurance coverage, reasoning that it was neither
material nor relevant and was hence inadmissible
as evidence. The Court declared that:
"Plaintiff's suggestion that the policy may
afford her rights of which she would not be
able to avail herself unless she is permitted
to inspect it, does not concern the pending
lawsuit. Rather, it concerns a subsequent suit
against the insurer - if she prevails in this
one." (80 N.W.2d 567)
The Florida Supreme Court, in Brooks v.
Oioens, 97 So.2d 653 ( 1957), in denying plaintiff's
right to discover the defendant's policy limits
through Interrogatories, stated:
"V\Te adopt the view that . . . the limits of
liability insurance on a policy covering an
automobile of a defendant are not proper matters subject to discovery ... It is our view
that the rule is applicable only to those matters admissible in evidence or calculated reasonably to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."
The California Court, in Superior Insurance
Company v. Superior Court, 235 P.2d 833 (1951),
in considering an Order for the perpetuation of
testimony ruled that a witness could be compelled
to testify with reference to an insurance policy.
The Court in doing so construed Section 11580 of
its Insurance Code - which gives a right of action
by a judgment creditor directly against the debtor's
insurance carrier -as making an insurance policy
9

"a contractual relation created by statute which
would inure to the benefit of any and every person who might be negligently injured by the assured
... " ( 235 P.2d 835)
There is no provision in our Utah Insurance
Code similar to that relied on by the California
Court.
The Nevada Supreme Court, in State Ex Rel.
Allen v. Second Judicial District Court, 245 P.2d
999 (Nev. 1952), in rejecting the Superior case,
Supra, stated that Nevada had no such statute as
California and that the rule in Nevada was that as
set forth in the dissenting opinion in the Superior
case, wherein it was stated:
"The conclusion that an injured person has a
'discoverable interest' in the contract insuring the liability of the tort feasor whenever
an action is pending against the named insured, misconceives the relationship of the
parties. The demand of (applicant) to examine the policy by way of perpetuation of testimony is based upon the assertion that she expects to sue Superior Insurance Company
and its insured in the event that she obtains
a Judgment against him. But such litigation
will not be to 'recover' a loss under the policy;
properly classified, it is an action to be reimbursed for damages suffered. * * * The
primary purpose of allowing an injured person to sue the insurer is to protect the judgment creditor against the bankruptcy or insolvency of the debtor. * * * [Applicant]
claims to be entitled to know the amount of
10

the maxim um liability of the insurer and
the premiums paid on the policy. These facts
are nut germane to any issue which may be
presented in the action against the insured;
obviously the sole purpose of the present proceeding is to obtain information which will
aid in negotiating for a settlement. This is
not within the legitimate purview of the statutes providing for the perpetuation of testimony and the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum." ( 245 P.2d 1003)
It is interesting to note that even though the
California Courts have continued to follow the rule
laid down in the Superior case, in the recent case
of Laddon v. Superior Court, 334 P.2d 638 (1959),
the Court recognizes that it is not in the majority
and that its position is somewhat tenuous. The
Court said:
"While the decisions favoring discovery are
persuasive in their reasoning, we might be inclined to follow the majority view if the question were wholly new in California." ( 334
P.2d 639)
As in California, the Illinois State Supreme
Court, in People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 145 N.E.2d
588 (1957), looked to its statute on insurance giving a direct right of action against an insurer if
a judgment is not satisfied. The Court concluded:
"Thus, under our statutes, as in California,
liability insurance is not merely a private
matter for the sole knowledge of the carrier
and the insured, but is also for the benefit
of persons injured by the negligent operation
of insured's motor vehicle." (145 N.E.2d 592)
11

The Colorado Supreme Court, in the case of
Lucas v. District Court, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959), required defendant to furnish information to plaintiff pertaining to his liability insurance. The majority opinion, in addition to holding that under
its Rule 26 (b), any matter relevant to an action
could be inquired into regardless of whether or not
it was calculated to lead to a discovery of admissible
evidence, also looked to its Safety Responsibility
Act to conclude that the matter of liability insurance
was relevant. The Colorado act was cited as making
the insurance carrier's liability absolute whenever
loss or damage covered by the policy occurred .
Under Utah's Safety Responsibility Act, Title
41-12-19, through 23, U.C.A., 1953, the carrying
of liability insurance is not mandatory and the provisions of the Act cannot be applied to a liability
insurer unless it has in fact voluntarily filed a certificate of insurance as proof of financial responsibility on behalf of an individual insured.
The wording of the dissenting Justices in the
Lucas case, Supra, seem clearly applicable:
"If the legislature so chooses it may declare
the public policy of this state to require insurance coverage for all vehicles and drivers.
It has not done so and this court has no power
or right to invade the legislative field in this
regard since that arm of government has already spoken.
"The majority opinion proceeds on the false
premise that the purpose of a driver or owner
12

in carrying public liability insurance is to
protect the public. I venture to suggest that
human nature being what it is, the true purpose is to protect the insured f ram claims
by injured parties which may be reduced to
judgment. An examination of a modern liability insurance contract will disclose that
its purpose is to defend and indemnify. Public liability insurance policies in Colorado are
not issued 'pursuant' to our Safety Responsibility Law and are not third party beneficiary contracts before judgment under our
statute. Authorities cited in this regard are
not material to this matter." (345 P.2d 1072)
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746 (1958), having under consideration Rule 26 (b), identical in
wording to our Utah Rule, denied a plaintiff's right
of inquiry by interrogatories into the defendant's
liability policy. The Court, after reviewing all of
the decisions touching on the question, concluded:
'·'We believe that the decisions holding against
discovery in cases like the instant case are
better reasoned than those holding to the contrary. The California and Illinois cases cited
by respondent are based in part upon their
interpretation of statutes which, in our opinion, in nowise justify the broadening of the
language used in Rule 26(b), Supra." (327
P.2d 751)
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the recent case
of Sanders v. Ayrhart, 404 P.2d 589 ( 1965), in
sustaining the defendant's refusal to answer oral
interrogatories concerning his insurance coverage,
13

adopted the language used in the case of J eppeson
v. Swanson, 68 N.W. 2d 649 (Minn. 1955), in which
the Court states:
"It would seem to us that, even though the
discovery is not to be limited to facts which
may be admissible as evidence the ultimate
goal is to ascertain facts or information which
may be used for proof or defense of an action.
Such information may be discovered by leads
from other discoverable information. The purpose of the discovery rules is to take the surprise out of trials of cases, so that all relevant facts and information pertaining to the
action may be ascertained in advance of trial
Where it is sought to discover information
which can have no possible bearing on the
determination of the action on its merits, it
can hardly be within the rule. It is not intended to supply information for the personal
use of a litigant that has no connection with
the determination of the issues involved in
the action on their merits. Balazs v. Anderson, D.C.N.D. Ohio, 77 F.Supp. 612. 68 N.W.
2d at P. 656.

"Under the guise of liberal construction, we
should not emasculate the rules by permitting
something which never was intended or is
not within the declared objects for which they
were adopted. Neither should expedience or
the desire to dispose of lawsuits without trial,
however desirable that may be from the standpoint of relieving congested calendars, be permitted to cause us to lose sight of the limitations of the discovery rules or the boundaries beyond which we should not go. If,
perchance we have the power under the enabl14

ing act to extend the discovery rules to permit discovery of information desired for the
sole purpose of encouraging or assisting in
negotiations for settlement of tort claims, it
would be far better to amend the rules so as
to state what may and what may not be done
in that field than to stretch the present discovery rules so as to accomplish something
which the language of the rules does not permit." ( 404 P.2d 592).
The great majority of the State Courts have
refused to require defendants to reveal the information as to a defendant's liability insurance coverage.1
Only two state courts have required the disclosure of the insurance without qualification, but
several state courts have required the disclosure of
the insurance coverage information for limited
reasons, and where it appeared that the information may lead to relevant facts or admissible evi1 Arizona, DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746 (1958);
Connecticut, Verrastro v. Grecco, 149 A.2d 703 (1958); Delaware,
Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514; Florida, Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d
693; Georgia, Patillo v. Thompson, 128 S.E.2d 656; Idaho, Sanders
v. Ayrhart, 404 P.2d 589 (1965); Minnesota, Jeppesen v. Swanson,
68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); Missouri, State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363
S.W.2d 631 (does allow name of company, but not terms of contract); Montana, State ex rel. Hersman v. District Court of Sixth
Judicial District, 381 P.2d 799 (1963); Nebraska, Mecke v. Bahr,
129 N.W.2d 573 (1964); Nevada, State ex rel. Allen v. Second
Judicial District Court, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); New Hampshire,
Hardware Mutual Casualty Company v. Hopkins, 196 A.2d 66
( 1963) (allowed inspection of policies but amounts of insurance
coverage not required to be disclosed); New Jersey, Goheen v.
Goheen, 154 A.393 (1931); Oklahoma, Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d
170 (1957); South Dakota, Bean v. Best, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
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dence, or upon the basis of specific state statutes.2
The majority of the Federal Courts whose dec1s10ns on this question have been reported, have
refused to require the disclosure of the insurance
coverage. 3
Several Federal District Courts have required
the disclosure of the information, with the District
Court of the United States in California directing
the information to be revealed because it did lead
to a relevant issue of fact in the action.4
2 Alaska, Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (1964); California,
Superior Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 235 P.2d 833 (1951)
(based upon specific provisions of the California Code whereby
insurance policies inure to the benefit of third persons negligently
injured by an insured); Colorado, Lucas v. District Court of Pueblo
County, 345 P.2d 1064 ( 1959) (Court holding that insurance policy
was subject to State Financial Responsibility Law); Illinois,
People, ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957); Kentucky,
Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (1954); Michigan, Christie
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 111 N.W.2d 30 (1961);
Michigan, Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 248 N.W. 539 (1933);
(allowed because of the relevant fact as to car ownership); Mis·
souri, State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (allowed name
of insurance company only and for purpose of determining jurors
connection with company); New York Martyn v. Braunn, 59 N.Y.S.
- 2d 588 (1946) (based upon a relevant issue as to control of a
stoop upon which plaintiff claimed to have fallen).
3 Bisserier v. Manning (D. N.J. 1962) 207 F.Supp. 476; Cooper v.
Stender (ED Tenn. 1962) 30 F.R.D. 389; DiBiase v. Rederi A!B
Walship (ED N.Y. 1963) 32 F.R.D. 41; Flynn v. Williams (D.
Conn. 1958) 30 F.R.D. 66; Gallimore v. Dye (ED Ill. 1958) 21
F.R.D. 283; Hillman v. Penny (ED Tenn. 1962) 29 F.R.D. 159:
Langlois v. Allen (D. Conn. 1962) 30 F.R.D. 67; McClure v. Boeger
(ED Penn. 1952) 105 F.Supp. 612; McDaniel v. Mayle (ND Ohio
1962) 30 F.R.D. 399; McNelley v. P.erry (DC Tenn. 1955) 18
F.R.D. 360; Roembke v. Wisdom (SD Ill. 1958) 22 F.R.D. 197;
Rosenberger v. Vallejo (WD Penn. 1962) 30 F.R.D. 352.
4 Brackett v. Woodall Food Products (ED Tenn. 1951) 12 F.R.D. 4;
Furumizo v. U.S. (D. Hawaii 1963) 33 F.R.D. 18; Hill v. Greer
(D. N.J. 1961) 30 F.R.D. 64; Hooker v. Raytheon Co. (S.D. Cal.
1962) 31 F.R.D. 120 (relevant to issue of ownership of vessel);
Johanek v. Aberle (D. Mont. 1961) 27 F.R.D. 272; Novak v. Good
Will Grange (D. Conn. 1961) 28 F.R.D. 394; Orgel v. McCurdy
SD N.Y. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 585; Schwentner v. White (D. Mont. 1961)
199 F. Supp. 710.
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Rule 26 (b) states that discovery may relate
to anything relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, but whether the defendant
has or does not have liability insurance, is not relevant to the subject matter.
Liability insurance certainly does not relate to
the claim or defense of the examining party, or the
claim or defense of any other party, and it does not
relate to books, documents, or the identity and locations of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
Rule 26 provides that the fact that the testimony
sought would be inadmissible at trial does not make
it objectionable; however, the Rule specifically
states the testimony or evidence sought must appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
The inquiry as to the existence of liability insurance, the name of the company, and the policy
limits should be no more admissible in a personal
injury action than inquiry as to the wealth, income,
ownership of property, and other facts of the defendant's financial status.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully represents that the great
majority of the Courts have refused to require the
disclosure of insurance policy limits and information, and in this action, the disclosure of such information is not relevant to the subject matter of
the personal injury action, and the information is
17

not reasonably calculated to lead to the di8covery
of admissible evidence, and the information as to
the name of defendant's insurance company and
the limits of insurance has no possible bearing on
the determination of the action on its merits.
The Order of the District Court of Duchesne
County should be reversed and the defendant and
appellant not required to answer the Interrogatory
of plaintiffs and respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR.

By_ ---------------------------- -- ----------------------------909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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